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Shim: Assessing South Korea's Regional-power Status rebuilding the war-torn country under the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. But South Korea is also playing a crucial (but not well-recognized) role in other international-security hot spots. In 2004 Seoul deployed 3,600 troops to Iraq to support the nation-building process, the third-biggest contingent after the United States of America and the United Kingdom. In Lebanon, South Korean troops are now part of the United Nations peacekeeping mission to monitor and secure the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah forces, which staged a month-long war in May 2007. However, Seoul's foreign and security policies are not limited to the region of the Middle East; the country is also very present in another central issue concerning ongoing global and regional security affairs. As a member of the so-called SixParty Talks in Northeast Asia, South Korea is working together with the United States, Japan, China and Russia to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear (weapons) program. 3 Against this background, one might ask if these developments indicate Seoul's ambition to play a bigger and more distinguished role in regional and international relations. Is it reasonable to ask if Seoul's active engagement in current international and regional security politics might represent its wish to be regarded as a considerable (regional) power? As the introductory quote suggests, virtually nobody regards South Korea as anything but a middle power. It is often considered to be a shrimp among whales, with limited leeway to maneuver between other powerful regional players such as China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. The question to be examined here is the putative regional-power status of South Korea, because the country represents an interesting case in the debate on naming regional powers. For instance, one criteria for being a regional power is the material resources of a country, such as the size of its economy, military or population. In these realms, as will be shown later, South Korea is quite capable of keeping up with other assumed regional powers. So the main question this paper will ask is whether South Korea is a regional power or not, and if not, why.
The methodological approach used to evaluate South Korea's position will be based on the analytical frameworks and typologies compiled from the literature on regional powers. This approach will be introduced in the next section along with the different concepts of the term regional power and the selection of the methodological instruments. Subsequently, indicators of South Korean's putative status as a regional power will be analyzed. The concluding section will evaluate the findings and raise further research questions in reference to the regional-power concept. 3 Admittedly, it is hard to imagine South Korea not being involved in any North Korea-related issue, but, for instance, as the events of the so-called first nuclear crisis during the 1990 show, the Agreed Framework reached between the United States and North Korea was basically a product of direct bilateral negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang which left Seoul on the sidelines. Shim : Assessing South Korea's Regional-power Status
Definitions and Understandings of Regional Power
If one takes a brief look at the recent literature regarding the theory of regional powers, one can find a comprehensive collection of diverse definitions and concepts-regional great power, major regional power, great power, major power, secondary regional power and middle power, to list only some 4 -which overlap and intersect in terms of their meaning. It seems that only the notion of the superpower is not contested, otherwise there exists a rich pool of diverse offers.
When it comes to thinking of candidates who could be or actually are regional powers, the ongoing debate in various realms such as politics, the press and the scientific community generally cites the "usual suspects": Brazil, China, India and South Africa. 5 Further aspirants are Iran, Mexico, Nigeria or Japan (cf. Rubin 2006; Huntington, 1999: 36; Buzan/Waever 2003: 34; Nolte 2007: 3) . This list of potential regional powers can be extended quite arbitrarily, 6 something which indicates the difficulty of grasping the term conceptually and highlights the multitude of various definitions. Often, the conceptualization of the term lacks clear distinctive characteristics in relation to other similar classifications, so that several terms are applied for one and the same country.
While, for instance, Jonathan H. Ping (2005) classifies India as a middle power, Samuel Huntington elevates it to the category of major regional powers, which are in certain ways dominant in a region but not able to project their interests as globally as the only superpower, the United States (Huntington 1999: 36) . In contrast, the US government sees the South Asian country as a potential great/world power, citing its democratic development and its political and economic freedom (White House 2002: 26) . Japan may function as another example of the alternating usage of the term regional power. In the eyes of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (2003: 35) Japan represents a great power because of its hesitation to claim superpower status and its unbalanced power resources; Andrew F. Cooper et al. (1993: 19) consider it a middle power which demonstrates the tendency to seek multilateral solutions to international problems, to seek compromise in international disputes, and to practice good international citizenship. Interestingly, Ping (2005) does not even consider Japan a middle power. Another example of the mixing of the terms regional power and middle power is provided by Daniel Flemes (2007a Flemes ( , 2007b Husar et al. 2009). 6 For instance, Robert Pastor (1999: 25) includes Argentina, Iraq, Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan in addition to the above-mentioned countries. Oyvind Osterud (1992) formulates four conditions which characterize a state as a regional great power. According to these conditions, a state which is geographically part of a delineated region, is able to stand up against other states in the region, is highly influential in regional affairs, and, unlike to a middle power, might also be a great power on the world scale can be regarded as regional great power (Osterud 1992: 12) . But, in reference to the latter condition, Flemes asserts "that the author [Osterud] is mixing the characteristics of regional powers and great powers and making the distinction between regional powers and middle powers more difficult" (Flemes 2007a: 10) . The distinction of a middle power from a regional power seems to be particularly unclear (Nolte 2007: 10) . Whereas Eduard Jordaan (2003) differentiates middle powers into traditional and emerging middle powers, Flemes (2007b) equates the latter term with regional powers. Martin Wight (1978) differentiates between the concepts of middle and regional power in terms of geographical boundaries and determines a local/regional and global level. While states can be regional powers within their geographical proximity, they are regarded as middle powers in terms of the global level (Wight, 1978: 63) . Here, a conceptual difference between a middle power and a regional power is outlined, as the former term seems to refer to a state in the global hierarchy while the latter concept relates to a regional, more geographically limited context. However, Andrew Hurrell (2000: 1) states that the hitherto existing approaches and attempts to develop a theory of intermediate powers have led to a "dead-end." He proposes to take a constructivist position on this topic, a position which omits putative objective geopolitical and geo-economic criteria and focuses more on the socially constitutive character of such a position.
Thus the question which could be raised is how exactly to identify a regional power. To distinguish between overlapping meanings, several scholars have attempted to define the term (e.g. Hurrell 2000; Nolte 2006 Nolte , 2007 Ping 2005 Osterud 1992; Wight 1978; Jordaan 2003; Cooper et al. 1993; Cooper 1997) . Many of these authors have developed analytical frameworks which provide indicators to determine potential regional powers and to assess current regional or middle powers. According to these criteria, the following characteristics matter:
(1) Delimitation refers to the territorial, economic, cultural, or political context in which the potential regional power is embedded. (6) Integration refers to what kinds of institutional structures the actor is embedded or how involved it is in regional or global institutions.
(7) Recognition concerns the intersubjective character of interstate relations and asks how the actor's role as a regional power is noticed by others, or if it is even acknowledged.
The article will focus on four criteria selected from those above-pretension, endowment, influence, and recognition-because some points can be neglected or are overlapping in meaning, so that they can be summarized into the other indicators (which does not mean that the selected indicators are mutually exclusive). For instance, the delimitation of South Korea can be regarded as relatively uncontested, because the government sees itself (and is seen) as part (if not the heart of; cf. "Hub of (Northeast) Asia" in NSC 2004 , MOFAT 2008 of a region what is widely known as (North) East Asia. Integration into or participation in international or regional organizations or in other institutional settings can be closely connected to the ability of a country to influence outcomes of regional concern. In the next section this four-point catalogue will be applied in order to scrutinize South Korea's possible role as a regional power.
South Korea-a Regional Power?
In the recent literature about South Korea's position in the international system, there seems to be an obvious unity in regarding the country as a middle power which is unlikely to lead or incapable of leading and more likely to be led (cf. Rozman 2007 Rozman , 2006 Hilpert 2007; Robertson 2007; Kim/Lim 2007; Moon 2007) . In addition to Hilpert (2007: 15; see also quotation above) an exemplary case is Robertson (2007: 156) , who states, "Indeed, it's hard to think of South Korea as anything but a middle power." 7 However, some indications-such as a conference held in 2003 in Washington by the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies, which was titled "Korea's Rise as a Regional Power" and focused, according to the participants, on Seoul's growing significance in international and regional affairs (Hwang 2004 )-show that it is not unworldly to think of South Korea as a regional power. Another example of this viewpoint is provided by Zhiqun Zhu, who cites the country as a "regional power" (Zhu 2005) . By applying the selected indicators, we will review Seoul's position in the regional context. 
Pretension
Inherent to the term regional power is the connotation of leadership and a geographical reference to a specific area. Thus, the first step in analyzing South Korea's standing is to examine if there are indications of a pretension to regional leadership and which area this is related to. The latter question can be answered easily. According to official documents of South Korean government bodies, Northeast Asia, which comprises the Korean Peninsula, China, Japan, Russia Far East, Mongolia and Taiwan, is the first and foremost region on which the foreign and security policies of the administration are focused (NSC 2004; MND 2006) . foreign policy doctrine. The two bone of contention were the decades-old dispute regarding two rocky islets-in South Korea called "Dokdo" and in Japan "Takeshima"-located in the sea between the two countries and the conflict surrounding a Japanese textbook alleged of whitewashing Japanese crimes during Japan's colonial rule in Korea. While Seoul has exercised de facto control over the islets since 1956, both South Korea and Japan claim the tiny islands as their part of territory (Choi 2005) .
When the Japanese Shimane prefecture in March 2005 declared February 22 to be Takeshima Day and Japan's ambassador to South Korea stated that the islets belonged historically and legally to Japan, the South Korean government demonstrated an unusually drastic reaction.
Seoul regarded Tokyo's claim to the islands as an attempt to justify its colonial rule and a denial of South Korea's sovereignty and independence. In a strongly worded statement from the South Korean president, Japan was warned that "there could be a hard diplomatic war
[…] that may reduce exchanges in various sectors and cause economic difficulty." The statement further noted, "we do not have to worry much about it […] we are determined to take the hardship on our shoulders if we really have to," demonstrating the firm resolve on the part of the Seoul government (Lee TJ 2005) . To underline its stance Seoul sent four air force jets to intercept a Japanese light plane, which was flying towards the disputed islets (The Straits Times Interactive 2005). This firm reaction constituted a renunciation of the previous policy of so-called "quiet diplomacy" regarding Dokdo/Takeshima, displaying the shift in Seoul's foreign policy posture. Up until that point it had remained relatively silent regarding Japanese claims to the contentious islets in order to avoid making the islets an internationally recognized disputed area. "Quiet diplomacy" was intended to avoid attracting international interest to an issue which was not an issue in the eyes of the Korean government. In a later speech in 2006 President Roh abandoned the former policy approach, stating, "the matter of Dokdo can no longer be dealt with through quiet diplomacy" (CWD 2006 
Endowment
Among the candidates considered to be regional powers, such as Brazil, South Africa, India, China, Japan and Russia there seems to be one feature they all have in common-sheer size. 9 Be it the number of inhabitants (China, India), the size of the territory (Russia, Brazil), or the strength of the economy related to expenditures for the military or for technological research and development activities (Japan), brute material facts appear to determine the capacity to act in the international system and to reflect the position of a state in the global/regional hi- To summarize, in terms of material capabilities such as the military, the economy and science and technology resources, South Korea appears able to support its claim for a more considerable role in regional politics.
Influence
This section will review South Korea's influence in regional affairs with respect to processes of regional institutionalization and integration and issues of regional security. As previously mentioned, the focus of South Korean foreign policy activities is Northeast Asia. Hence, most of Seoul's attempts to advance regional cooperation have been centered on this region. Nevertheless, efforts towards a geographically broader approach concerning the promotion of regionalism in East Asia have also been undertaken. Indeed, Robertson concludes that, unlike Beijing or Tokyo, Seoul "did not accord strategic considerations great value in its approach to East Asian regionalism" and further elaborates that "it did not seek a leadership role" (Robertson 2006: 6) , citing among other things the unstable political system, the missing Rozman 2007: 197-8, italics in original) Besides its focus on founding regional security mechanisms, Seoul has also concentrated on other fields, such as the environment, to coordinate regional regime-building activities (Lee 12 KEDO is an organization founded in 1995 to implement the Agreed Framework reached between the United 
Recognition
To be a regional power, it is not sufficient just to claim leadership; a country must also be accepted as a regional power by other countries. This reality highlights the social dimension of the term. As Andrew Hurrel states,
You can claim Great Power status but membership of the club of Great Powers is a social category that depends on recognition by others-by your peers in the club, but also by smaller and
weaker states willing to accept the legitimacy and authority of those at the top of the international hierarchy. (Hurrell 2000: 3) Thus, one might say that the term regional power is a social construction, because its meaning is based on the shared and intersubjective understanding of relevant actors. The question to ask here is therefore whether South Korea is accepted by other states as a power for regional leadership, as was stated, for instance, in its "regional balancer" policy (see Section 3.2).
On the one hand, one might say that South Korean leadership was, for instance, accepted by the country's surrounding neighbors when it dominated the Northeast Asian security agenda in 2000, with the inter-Korean summit at its peak. Seoul's policy of engaging with North Korea was fully acknowledged and supported by the United States, China, Japan, and Russia.
Seoul seemed to be able to dominate the direction of the region's politics by pursuing its 18 Shim: Assessing South Korea's Regional-power Status strategy of bringing peace first to the Korean Peninsula and then, subsequently, to the Northeast Asian region (Rozman 2006: 159) .
Yet on the other hand, as Zhu (2007: 82) asserts, it is not clear if major powers in the region are prepared to concede a leading role in regional security affairs to Seoul. For instance, the Chinese government has declared that it will only support South Korea's plan to play the role of a balancing power if it contributes to peace and stability in the region, indicating Beijing's unease about an imminent power competition in the region (Jin/Yoon 2006; Sheen 2006: 15) . The United States and Japan have also been hesitant about the balancer rationale, because they have feared that Seoul could distance itself from the security alliance with Washington and move closer to Beijing and because it is unclear whether South Korea intends to play a competing role as a regional leader. South Korea has made several attempts to explain to its traditional security ally its position that the balancer policy is only to be pursued on the basis of the Korea-US military alliance (Jin 2005) .
The reactions to the current policy of balancing show that this concept has not been endorsed by other countries. Even at home the government's initiative has invited heavy criticism from the domestic opposition, which has cited the policy as impractical and has accused the ad- Since Canberra has not received many negative responses to its intention to be a facilitator-either from inside or from outside-it seems that Australia is considered by other powers to be an honest broker. Zhu (2007: 82) cites trust as the key to successful mediation, concluding, "South Korea does not seem to enjoy the trust of Japan or the United
States." This makes it therefore impossible for Seoul to play its intended role.
Conclusion
The starting point of this analysis was the observation that, to date, the practice of naming regional powers has been concentrated on many candidates, but not on South Korea, although, as has been demonstrated, the country has the (predominantly material) capacity to keep up with other aspiring regional power in certain areas. This article has asked if it is reasonable to regard South Korea as a regional power. The findings present an ambivalent picture. Using the conceptual framework developed in the second section to examine regional powers, it has been demonstrated that Seoul is eager to play a more active and self-assertive role in Northeast Asian politics and is able to keep up with relevant actors on the regional and international level in terms of certain material capabilities. Further, it has been demonstrated that South Korea can maneuver between its supposedly more powerful neighbors and is capable of influencing regional affairs according to its interests. Yet because the concept of regional power also has a social dimension, which lies in achieving intersubjective understanding and acceptance from other actors, it is difficult to fully apply the term to the country under scrutiny. 14 At this stage the lack of acknowledgment from other peers therefore appears to be the main obstacle to regarding South Korea as a regional power. Furthermore, if one expands the analytical indicators used here (pretension, endowment, influence, and recognition) to include criteria such as normative behavior, which was also introduced in the second section of the paper, it can be asked whether South Korea fulfils these criteria completely. For instance, South Korea's foreign policy stance is to support and promote democracy, freedom, a market economy, international law, norms of peaceful conflict resolution, and human rights (e.g. MOFAT 2008 ). Yet it can be asked whether the country's socalled "resource diplomacy," intended to increase the country's energy security through relations with some Central Asian (for example, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan), Middle Eastern (for example, Saudi Arabia) and African (for example, Sudan) states might conflict with these norms. Further, given the above-mentioned incidents between South Korea and Japan and Seoul's reaction to these events ("no compromise or surrender is possible, whatever the costs and sacrifices may be," see above), it seems that it is difficult for the country to balance between (partly) domestic imperatives and self-formulated pretensions of good international citizenship. A simple answer to why Seoul might not represent a regional power-provided one thinks in purely material terms-could be that it does not possess the necessary demographic numbers or geographic size in relation to its neighbors. That is to say, if South Korea were located in the Middle East, in Africa, or even in Europe one could feel more inclined to speak of the country in terms of a regional power. However, the importance or relevance of answering the question of whether Seoul represents a regional power (or not) might actually lie in its implications for the future landscape in regional affairs. One key characteristic of Northeast Asian affairs is the convergence (of interests) of several actors, such as the nuclearpower states China, Russia, the United States and the de facto nuclear state North Korea, while Japan also has to be accounted for in this constellation. Within this concert of powers, the actors involved could potentially ask themselves how to handle an additional powerful player in regional politics in the future.
Some further research questions which could be raised regarding the notion of regional powers could concern broadening the scope of the state-centric concept. It could firstly be asked if only single states can be regional powers or if it is also possible to include other entities or actors relevant in current global politics, since one constituent of the notion of a regional power seems to be the capacity to act in an external direction. In this vein, the research focus could be shifted to nonstate actors (such as nongovernmental organizations or multinational corporations), multilateral and bilateral intergovernmental institutions (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the New Partnership for Africa's Development, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the Union of South American Nations or the Japan-US / Korea-US alliance), or supranational organizations (such as the European Union). It could be asked whether the European Union, with its integrated Common Foreign and Security Policy or its European Defence and Security Policy, also constitutes a "regional power"? If so, questions about certain actors such as Germany, France, or the United Kingdom within this complex could follow. Are they then regional powers within a regional-powers complex? It can be noted that European countries have been relatively neglected in the current debate on the naming of regional powers. Yet, it should also be noted that answers to these questions depend on the use of the terms/concepts "region" and "power" in a given context. In other words, the particular notions of "region" and "power" one wishes to apply guide the answers to these questions.
